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Abstract—Bidders in day-ahead electricity markets want to
sell/buy electricity when their bids generate positive surplus and
not to take an action when the reverse holds. However, non-
convexities in these markets cause conflicts between the actions
that the bidders want to take and the actual market results. In
this work, we investigate the non-convex market clearing problem
of Turkish market operator and propose three different rule
sets. The first rule set allows both rejection of bids with positive
surplus and acceptance of bids with negative surplus. The second
and the third sets only allow one of these conflicted cases. By
using total surplus maximization as the objective, we formulate
three models and statistically explore their performance with the
real data taken from Turkish market operator.
Index Terms—Electricity market design, non-convexities, em-
pirical study, mixed integer quadratic programming, paired t-test
I. INTRODUCTION
Deregulation processes in the electricity industry have taken
place in the last few decades. Starting in Chile 1982, it spread
to many countries around the world including Turkey. In
Turkey, the deregulation process started with the introduction
of the first Electricity Market Law and the establishment of
Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) in 2001.
The law was amended three times in 2012, 2013 and 2016.
Currently, competition is in place at generation and wholesale
layers. In addition, retail market competition is expected to
increase with gradually decreasing eligible consumer limits.
The wholesale electricity market in Turkey has been oper-
ated by Energy Exchange Istanbul (EXIST) since its establish-
ment in September, 2015. EXIST operates two electricity spot
markets, day-ahead and intra-day. A daily double-sided blind
auction is held in the day-ahead market under the principle
of uniform pricing. On the other hand, intra-day market is
operated under continuous trading mechanism.
The day-ahead auction in Turkey is very similar to its coun-
terparts in European markets. The participants of the auction
can submit three types of bids: hourly, block and flexible.
Hourly bids specify the quantity (production or consumption)
offered to the market as a piecewise linear function of market
clearing price. A block bid presents an indivisible amount of
quantity for a single price and may be valid for a multiple
consecutive periods as opposed to hourly bids. Lastly, flexible
bids also represent an indivisible amount of quantity but only
for a single period. As opposed to hourly and block bids,
flexible bids are not submitted for a particular period and can
be evaluated at any period by the market clearing algorithm.
Given the set of submitted bids, the main function of the
market operator is to determine the hourly market clearing
prices and matching results for the bids (accepted quantity for
an hourly bid, accept/reject decision for a block bid and the
accepted period for a flexible bid if accepted). In the absence
of indivisibility requirements of block and flexible bids, it
is well-known that welfare maximizing solution clears the
market and equilibrium prices exist. However, the indivisibility
requirement transforms the market clearing problem into a
non-convex problem such that equilibrium prices may not
exist. That is, the marginal prices at the surplus maximizing
solution may cause bidders to miss additional profits or even
incur loss. In order to avoid such undesired market results,
power exchanges may adopt additional constraints to the mar-
ket clearing problem at the expense of suboptimal solutions in
terms of market surplus.
The main challenge faced by EXIST is whether to inte-
grate such rules to the market clearing problem. Without any
additional constraints, the welfare maximizing solution may
include undesired bid results such that a bidder who incurred
a loss would be better off by not committing the matching
quantity or a bidder who missed a profit would be better off
by committing additional quantities. To remedy this problem978-1-5090-5499-2/17/$31.00 c©2017 IEEE
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at least partly, one option is to add a set of constraints to
the market clearing problem to guarantee that no one incurs a
loss. Similarly, another option could be to ensure that no one
incurs a loss of profit at the expense of bids at loss. In this
case, some compensation mechanism needs to be established
to pay for the total loss of the bidders. Note that market loss
and loss of profit cannot be prevented at the same time.
The widely accepted European solution is to prevent market
loss. To do that, a common practice is to build a primal-dual
formulation with complementarity constraints and relax some
of them to guarantee the feasibility and no loss property. For
example, the coupled markets of Europe are cleared by the
algorithm named EUPHEMIA which satisfy this requirement
[1]. In the literature, there are studies proposing formulations
and solution methods for this problem, [2], [3] and [4]. In these
studies, the authors present MILP or MIQP formulations (de-
pends on the type of hourly bids: stepwise or piecewise) and
branch-and-cut algorithms based on Bender’s decomposition
to solve those problems.
In addition to the studies proposing solution methods for
the current European pricing mechanism, there are some other
studies discussing alternative pricing rules. For example, [5]
suggests to price integral activities like start-ups as indepen-
dent commodities complementary to the energy commodity. It
means that when a supply block bid is accepted, the associated
start-up price must be paid to the bidder in addition to the
money received for the energy to be produced. [6] examines
and compares US and EU models in terms of optimality of
market surplus, existence of Walrasian equilibrium, whether
the bidders bid truthfully or the auctioneer encounters missing
money problem. In addition, the author proposes a non-
uniform pricing mechanism for the problem.
Recently, [7] investigates applicability of non-uniform pric-
ing proposed in [6] for the European market in terms of
economic, algorithmic and legal perspectives. The authors
argue that uniform pricing may cause the rejection of some
bids with potentially positive surplus and the increase in such
occurrences at the last years challenge the confidence of the
market participants on the optimality of the results. The model
proposed allows the acceptance of bids at loss, but then those
bidders are compensated (with uplifts payments) by the ones
having positive surplus. The non-uniform pricing algorithm is
run on real instances of Belgium market and the results are
compared with the ones under uniform pricing in terms of
computation time, welfare and required uplifts.
In the Turkish day-ahead market, the current pricing mech-
anism prevents the rejection of bids with potentially positive
surplus. On the other hand, it allows to acceptance of bids
at loss but those bids are then settled from their bid price
instead of market clearing price. So, those bidders are fully
compensated by the market operator. However, the resulting
budget deficit of market operator is again financed by the
market participants with a posterior procedure.
Both Turkish and European models produce suboptimal
solutions in terms of market total surplus. European practice
sticks to uniform pricing despite the fact that some bids with
very favorable prices compared to market clearing prices could
be rejected. This practice may prevent to achieve market
equilibrium. On the other hand, Turkish model deviates from
uniform pricing but succeeds market equilibrium by compen-
sating the bidders at loss.
In this study, we test three pricing mechanisms on past
bid sets of EXIST and compare the results in terms of some
performance measures interested by EXIST. Our ultimate aim
is to help policy makers to choose the best practice for day-
ahead market pricing. In particular, we would like to know
whether the three pricing rules lead to significant differences
on total market surplus and market clearing prices. We also
try to estimate the cost of integrating rules such as “no bid
at loss” or “no rejection of bids with favorable prices” into
the market clearing algorithm in terms of the magnitude of
deviation from optimal market surplus.
We contribute to the literature by presenting comprehensive
empirical results for different pricing mechanisms on a large
set of real instances. The computational results cover com-
parisons on performance measures like total surplus, number
of bids accepted at loss or rejected with potential positive
surplus and the price deviation of those bids from market
clearing prices. Lastly, we propose a different formulation
for the market clearing problem than the common European
formulation.
In the next section, we present the necessary definitions to
state the problem and give the notations. In Section III, we give
the mathematical models for the basic surplus maximization
problem and two variants of it for European and Turkish mar-
kets. Afterwards, we present the results of our computational
tests in Section IV and discuss our findings in Section V. We
conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Indices and Sets
t, T Index and set of time periods.
l, L Index and set of hourly bid directions,
where l can be either supply (s) or demand (d),
i.e., L = {s, d}
i, Ilt Index and set of hourly bid segment indices for l and t.
b, B Index and set of block bids
Parameters
Pmin, Pmax Minimum and maximum price limits.
P 0ilt, P
1
ilt Initial and final price for segment i, direction l and period t,
Qilt Quantity of segment i ∀ i ∈ Ilt, l ∈ L, t ∈ T .
Pb, Qbt Price and quantity of block bid b, ∀ b ∈ B, ∀ t ∈ T
Hourly bids consist of a set of quantity price pairs where
each pair shows the maximum/minimum price that a bidder
is willing to buy/sell the corresponding quantity. The total
quantity offered for a price level in a period is the sum
of the corresponding quantities for each hourly bid. When
buy and sell quantities are separated, the resulting aggregated
quantity price pairs form a supply and a demand curve in
the corresponding period. The former is a non-decreasing and
the latter is a non-increasing function of quantity. Each area
between the pairs forms a segment where P 0ist ≤ P 1ist for all
i ∈ Ist, t ∈ T and P 1idt ≤ P 0idt for all i ∈ Idt, t ∈ T . Quantity
of segment i is the difference of quantities of consecutive pairs
where Qist ≤ 0 for all i ∈ Ist, t ∈ T and Qidt ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ Idt, t ∈ T .
Decision Variables
xilt Accepted fraction of segment i, ∀ i ∈ Ilt, l ∈ L, t ∈ T .
yb 1 if block bid b is accepted, 0 otherwise, ∀ b ∈ B.
pt Market clearing price at period t.
wilt 1 if segment l at period t is fully accepted, 0 otherwise.
Given market clearing price vector p = [p1, p2, ...], a block
bid b ∈ B is in-the-money if ∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt) > 0, it is out-
of-the-money if
∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt) < 0 and it is at-the-money,
otherwise. If an in-the-money block bid is rejected, then it is
called paradoxically-rejected-bid (PRB). On the other hand, if
an out-of-the-money block bid is accepted, then it is called
paradoxically-accepted-bid (PAB). Let B0 and B1 be the set
of PRBs and PABs, respectively. Then, we define total loss
(TL) and total loss of profit (TLP) as follows:
TL = −
∑
b∈B1
∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt) (1)
TLP =
∑
b∈B0
∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt) (2)
Similarly, we also need to define maximum loss (MUL) and
maximum loss of profit (MULP) per unit energy in order to
assess the fairness of auction result among the bidders.
MUL = max
b∈B1
∣∣∑
t∈T
(Pb − pt)
∣∣ (3)
MULP = max
b∈B0
∣∣∑
t∈T
(Pb − pt)
∣∣ (4)
III. MARKET CLEARING MODELS
We only consider hourly and block bids where the latter sig-
nal all-or-nothing requirements of the participants, therefore,
create non-convexities in the system. We exclude flexible and
linked block bids for the sake of simplicity of the presentation.
The type of the hourly bids determines the type of the
objective function, hence the type of the model. If the quantity
offered by an hourly bid is a stepwise function of price, then
the model is a mixed integer linear program (MILP). On the
other hand, if bid quantity is a piecewise linear function of
the price, then the objective function is quadratic, and the
problem becomes mixed integer quadratic program (MIQP).
In this study, we assume that all hourly bids are piecewise
linear functions so that the problem is MIQP.
The well-known non-convex surplus maximization model
(M1) is constrained by only the clearing constraints (supply-
demand balance). The non-convexity of (M1) is due to all-
or-nothing nature of the block bids. Thus, there may occur
both PRBs and PABs at the optimal solution of (M1) failing
to achieve Walrasian equilibrium. Adding constraints to (M1)
which eliminate both PAB and PRBs is not possible since the
resulting problem may be infeasible under block bid integrality
constraints. Therefore, power exchanges assent one of these
requirements.
In the following part, we first present (M1). Then, we give
the two variant models in which either PRBs or PABs are
allowed.
A. Case 1: Allowing both paradoxically accepted and rejected
block bids
In this section, we formulate model (M1) where there is
only supply and demand balance constraint in addition to the
bounds on the segment variables.
(M1)
max
∑
t∈T
(∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Ilt
QiltP
0
iltxilt +Qilt(P
1
ilt − P 0ilt)
x2ilt
2
+
∑
b∈B
QbtPbyb
)
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Ilt
Qiltxilt +
∑
b∈B
Qbtyb = 0, ∀t ∈ T (5)
xilt ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Ilt, t ∈ T, l ∈ L (6)
xilt ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Ilt, t ∈ T, l ∈ L, yb ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B
(7)
Constraint (5) defines supply-demand balance for each
period, (6) ensures that accepted fraction of a segment does
not exceed 1 and (7) includes variable non-negativity and
integrality constraints.
B. Case 2: Allowing only paradoxically rejected block bids
One alternative of a market operator is to allow PRBs and
eliminate PABs. In this setting, the market operator does not
have a missing money problem and all energy is cleared from
the same price. This is the widely accepted European solution.
We refer to this model as (M2).
(M2) is formulated by adding constraints (8)-(11) to model
(M1).
Mb(yb − 1) ≤
∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt), (8)
where Mb =
∑
t∈T Qbt(Pmax − Pmin). When bid b is out-
of-the-money, i.e.,
∑
t∈T Qbt(Pb − pt) < 0, bid b is rejected,
but when it is in-the-money, b may be accepted or rejected.
Hence, (8) forces out-of-the-money bids to reject.
In this model and the following one, we need to integrate
the market clearing price variables into the problem. This, in
turn, necessiates to explicitly model hourly bid equilibrium
constraints.The following constraint relates pt and hourly bid
equilibrium quantities.
pt = Pmin +
∑
i∈Ist
(P 1ist − P 0ist)xist, ∀t ∈ T
pt = Pmax +
∑
i∈Idt
(P 1idt − P 0idt)xidt, ∀t ∈ T
(9)
Constraint (10) guarantees that an hourly bid segment
cannot be accepted unless the preceding one is accepted at
full.
wilt ≤ xilt ≤ w(i−1)lt, ∀i ∈ Ilt, t ∈ T, l ∈ L
w0lt = 1, w|Ilt|lt = 0 ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (10)
wilt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T, l ∈ L (11)
C. Case 3: Allowing only paradoxically accepted block bids
Another alternative is to prevent PRBs and allow PABs.
This is the rule in the current Turkish market. The PABs are
settled from the bid price so that their loss is compensated.
This creates the missing money problem, which is called side
payment in Turkish market context, but supports equilibrium
in the market. Both bidders having PAB or PRB cannot be
better off by changing the commitments determined by the
market operator. We refer this model as model (M3).
(M3) is formulated by adding constraints (9)-(12) to model
(M1). ∑
t∈T
Qbt(Pb − pt) ≤Mbyb, (12)
where Mb =
∑
t∈T Qbt(Pmax−Pmin). While b has positive
surplus then yb must be 1, therefore, (12) eliminates PRBs.
Yet, when b has negative surplus then yb may still take value
1, which may cause PAB.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
In this section, we first summarize the market data used
in the experiments. Then, we briefly explain the performance
measures used to compare three pricing models stated in Sec-
tion III. Afterwards, we specify the scope of our computational
tests and present the results in a comparative manner.
A. Data
In our computational experiments, we use real bid data sets
of Turkish day-ahead market. The instances cover the period
from the very beginning of the market in 2012 up to midst of
2016. The total number of instances used in the experiments
reach up to around 1600. The bid data set includes private
pricing information of market players and therefore is not
publicized. In the following two tables, we present the main
characteristics of the Turkish day-ahead market bid sets in
terms of daily average bid counts and volumes.
Table I reveals that the daily average number of bids in
the auction does not show a clear increasing pattern over the
years. On the contrary, the number of demand block bids
decreased sharply from 2014 to 2015. A majority of block
bids are offered to sell energy to the market.
Apart from the bid counts, we see in Table II that total
supply volume is more than total demand volume offered to
the market in the last years. In addition, the share of hourly
bids in supply volume decreasing slightly as opposed to the
increasing share of hourly bid volumes in demand.
TABLE I: The daily average number of bids in Turkish
DAM with respect to bid types
Year Hourly Bids Supply Block Bids Demand Block Bids
2012 7,323 87 46
2013 8,808 107 42
2014 10,064 99 38
2015 9,815 117 15
TABLE II: The daily average volume of supply and demand
bids in Turkish DAM with respect to bid types
Supply (MWh) Demand (MWh)
Year Hourly Bids Block Bids Hourly Bids Block Bids
2012 259,873 (80%) 64,680 (20%) 249,517 (64%) 139,439 (36%)
2013 305,585 (80%) 86,638 (20%) 268,786 (71%) 112,213 (29%)
2014 365,889 (78%) 104,438 (22%) 312,593 (72%) 122,798 (28%)
2015 384,084 (72%) 150,849 (28%) 364,695 (92%) 30,535 (8%)
* Values in parentheses show the ratio of corresponding volumes to the
total supply or demand volumes.
B. Performance Measures
In a convex market clearing problem, total surplus maxi-
mizing solution is the best economic solution. It clears the
market at equilibrium prices and do not lead to market loss or
loss of profit. If this is the case, the auctioneer does not need
any other criteria to evaluate the auction results. However, in
non-convex markets like today’s day-ahead electricity markets,
the market operator needs to take into account multiple and
most of the times conflicting objectives. In EXIST, the scores
of auction result in the following performance measures are
monitored on a daily basis:
TABLE III: Performance measures
Total surplus TS
Daily average of market clearing prices MCP
Number of PABs #PAB
Number of PRBs #PRB
Total loss (incurred by PAB bids) TL
Total loss of profit (missed profit by PRBs) TLP
Maximum loss per unit energy MUL
Maximum loss of profit per unit energy MULP
The smaller is the better for all criteria except the first and
second one. For EXIST, occurrences of PABs or PRBs are
equally undesirable. Hence, we do not differentiate between
number of PABs or PRBs and associated loss or loss of profit
values. That is, we consider the sum of these values when
interpreting the results associated with model (M1). In other
models, at least one of those values are zero anyway.
C. Tests
We apply three pricing models given in Section III to each
instance in our sample. We call the MIQP solver of IBM ILOG
CPLEX 12.6.3 to solve the associated MIQP problems. We set
the absolute gap tolerance to 100 Turkish liras (1 Turkish lira
is around 0.26 Euros at the time of this writing.), time limit to
120 seconds and left other solver parameters at their default
values. We exclude an instance from the comparisons if any
of three problems could not be solved to the optimality under
the given time limit. In addition, we exclude the cases if price
caps became binding in the optimal solution of at least one of
the three cases. Thus, we try to measure the pure effect of the
pricing rules by eliminating possible distortions by the sub-
optimality of the solutions. The number of instances where
we were able to find the optimal solutions for all three cases
is 1538 out of 1631.
At the end of each run, we store the values of performance
measures at the optimal solution found. We did not take into
account the existence of alternative optima and no posterior
procedure was implemented to pick a specific one of them.
For each performance measure k, we build the following
hypotheses separately:
Hk12 : µ(M1k)− µ(M2k) = 0 (13)
Hk13 : µ(M1k)− µ(M3k) = 0 (14)
Hk23 : µ(M2k)− µ(M3k) = 0 (15)
We test the hypotheses by using paired t-test with Type-
1 error set to 0.05, i.e. α = 0.05. We report the associated
p−value statistics and (1 − α) confidence intervals on the
population means.
D. Results
In Table IV, we report the results of the hypotheses as well
as the sample mean differences, X¯ . Last two columns show
the 95% confidence limits where LCL and UCL corresponds
to lower and upper confidence limit, respectively. p−values
smaller than α show that the corresponding hypothesis is
rejected whereas larger values imply that we fail to reject
the given hypothesis. Following figures further expose the
dispersion of differences among model pairs for each per-
formance criterion. In the given box-plots, horizontal borders
of the boxes correspond to first, second and third quartile,
respectively. The lowest and highest lines, called whiskers,
are 1.5 times the inter-quartile range away from the boxes.
The data points outside the whiskers are called outliers which
are not shown on some of the figures for the sake of display
quality.
First of all, Table IV shows that there is no significant
difference in total surplus between model (M2) and (M3). In
addition, it seems that pricing with model (M2) or (M3) costs
minor surplus losses which are expected to be around 2,000
Turkish liras per day on the average. Figure 1 shows the spread
of total surplus differences among the model pairs. In all cases,
medians are very close to zero and (M2)-(M3) differences
seem to distribute around zero symmetrically. Although not
shown on the figure, we would like to note that extreme
outliers at both directions may reach up to 50,000 and -50,000
Turkish liras.
In terms of market clearing prices, we can argue that
model (M2) increases the daily average around 2 Turkish liras
compared to model (M3) on the average. This can be attributed
TABLE IV: Test statistics reported for the hypotheses build
on each performance measure and pair of models
Criterion (k) Hypothesis X¯ p− value LCL UCL
TS
Hk12 2,375 0 2,111 2,639
Hk13 2,256 0 2,000 2,512
Hk23 -119 0.52 -485 248
MCP
Hk12 -1.14 0 -1.26 -1.02
Hk13 0.93 0 0.82 1.04
Hk23 2.07 0 1.9 2.23
#PAB + #PRB
Hk12 -0.14 0 -0.20 -0.08
Hk13 -0.16 0 -0.23 -0.09
Hk23 -0.02 0.61 -0.11 0.07
TL + TLP
Hk12 -108,774 0 -122,425 -95,122
Hk13 62,997 0 53,775 72,218
Hk23 171,770 0 155,446 188,096
Max. price diff.*
Hk12 -2.85 0 -3.25 -2.45
Hk13 -3.08 0 -3.51 -2.64
Hk23 -0.23 0.44 -0.80 0.35
* Max. price diff. = max{MUL,MULP}
Fig. 1: Box plots for the total surplus differences among the
model pairs
to the large proportion of supply block bid volume in the total
block bid volume (around 83% in 2015). Since model (M3)
is expected to accept more block bids compared to (M2) and
most of them are supply bids, market clearing prices tend to
decrease with model (M3). As Figure 2 shows, there are more
outliers on the upper side of the last box plot reaching up to
20 Turkish liras.
Our computational tests revealed that at 20% of all cases,
optimal solution of (M1) did not lead to any PAB or PRB.
That is, three models share the same optimal solution at the
20% of the cases. In addition, in 42% of cases there were
no PABs and in 45% of cases there were no PRBs at the
optimal solution of (M1). Although t-test statistics show that
(M1) generates less paradoxical bids on the average compared
to other models, the difference is very small. In addition, no
significant difference has been found between average number
of PRBs in (M2) and average number of PABs in (M3).
We see in Table IV that the total loss of profit missed
Fig. 2: Box plots for the daily average MCP differences
among the model pairs
by PRBs dominates the actual loss incurred by PABs. (M3)
significantly reduces the sum of those two amounts on the
average whereas (M2) increases it.
A striking result comes at the price differences between
paradoxical bid prices and the average market clearing prices
of the periods where those bids are active. Test results show
that both (M2) and (M3) increases MUL or MULP on the
average compared to (M1). Actually, the differences can
become quite large. Figure 3 shows that both MULP and
MUL in models (M2) and (M3) may extend up to 150
Turkish liras more compared to (M1). We should note that
maximum average market clearing price in our sample is 340
Turkish liras. In case of (M1) pricing, the maximum of MUL
and MULP in the sample is at most 30 Turkish liras. This
observation is also noted by [6] to criticize the fairness of
European model and mainly attributed to the existence of block
bids with small volumes together with other block bids very
large in the volume.
Fig. 3: Box plots for the maximum paradoxical bid price
differences among the model pairs
V. DISCUSSION
Our computational results show that integrating market
pricing rules to prevent bidders from loss or loss of profit
do not lead to substantial surplus loss on the average for
the historical bid set of Turkish day-ahead market. However,
for the market instances with higher percentages of block
bid volumes, the differences can be expected to be larger.
Similarly, average market clearing prices do not change too
much on the average with the experimented pricing models
although outlier price differences as much as 20 Turkish liras
exist. But, the real cost of those additional pricing rules shows
up as rejection of too deep in-the-money bids or acceptance
of too far out-of-the-money bids.
In [6], the author compares US and EU models in terms
of welfare maximization, Walrasian equilibrium, truth-telling,
fairness among bidders and market operator’s missing money.
Convex auctions are welfare maximizing, achieves Walrasian
equilibrium, encourages bidders to bid truthfully, generates
fair results and the amount of money received and paid by
the market operator is always equal (no missing money). In
addition, achieving the optimal solution is rather easy.
For the nonconvex auctions in the European markets in-
cluding Turkey, all of the desired properties mentioned above
is hard to satisfy if not impossible at all. In Table V, we
compare the pricing models presented here in terms of those
characteristics. Pricing by (M2) and (M3) are not welfare
maximizing due to the additional constraints in the models.
(M3) assures Walrasian equilibrium since the in-the-money
bids are not rejected and accepted out-of-the-money bids are
compensated. However, it may not give strong incentives to
bidders to bid truthfully since it is possible to have some bids
settled from more favorable prices than the market clearing
prices. If we define fairness as the magnitude of maximum
loss or missed profit per unit of energy, we would like it to be
as small as possible. In this regard, we can claim that pricing
with (M1) results in more fair results compared to (M2) or
(M3).
TABLE V: The comparison of three pricing
models
M1 M2 M3
Welfare Maximizing X
Walresian Equilibrium X
Truth-telling X
Fair X
No missing money X
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented three different models for Turkish day-
ahead electricity market by considering only hourly and block
bids which constitute almost all of the Turkish day-ahead mar-
ket volume. By using real data taken from the market operator,
the models are solved and their performances are compared
in terms of total surplus, average market clearing prices,
number of PABs and PRBs, total loss and loss of profit and
maximum absolute difference between matching and market
clearing prices. Our statistical experiments revealed insightful
results for the Turkish market operator on the efficiency of the
current and alternative market designs. According to paired t-
test results, we fail to reject the hypothesis that there is a
difference between (M2) and (M3) in terms of average total
surplus, but the average market clearing prices differ around 2
Turkish liras. Moreover, total loss and loss of profit changes
significantly among (M1), (M2) or (M3). We also would like
to know how the results change when those characteristics
change. For this purpose, we will conduct similar experiments
on specially generated synthetic data. Furthermore, as EXIST
plans to integrate new bid types to the market, we plan to
extend the models and statistical tests correspondingly.
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